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The Truman Doctrine has generally been perceived as the
decisive factor which led to the defeat of the communist
insurgency in Greece in 1949. This doctrine is also credit-
ed with having stopped the spread of Soviet expansion in
Europe and the Balkans. However, available historical data
does not support the argument that Greece was saved from
communism by U.S. aid and assistance. In fact, current in-
formation indicates that the raisons d ' etre for this policy
were based on misperceptions and the lack of accurate infor-
mation. Grave doubts about the efficacy of the Truman Doc-
trine have also been cast by the continued spread of com-
munism beginning with the communist victory in China in 1949.
and the Korean War in 1950. This thesis is devoted to de-
termining the real impact of the Truman Doctrine on the
Greek civil war (1947-1949). In addition, an attempt is made
to divine the importance, effectiveness and meaning of the
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The United States emerged from the Second World War as
the single most powerful nation in the world. It had served
as the world arsenal for the wars against Germany and Japan.
It had played a direct and significant role in winning the
war. Its economy had not been destroyed by the enemy. Amer-
ica possessed the most destructive and awesome military
weapon the world had ever known — the atomic bomb. And yet,
the United States did not rule the world. In fact, as time
passed, despite its position and power, the United States in-
creasingly became incapable of forcing its will on others and
less able to influence certain key political events.
Until World War II, the United States had followed bas-
ically an isolationist foreign policy. It had remained aloof
from the power politics and Byzantine diplomatic maneuvers of
Europe and the rest of the world. Occasionally it had become
involved in foreign ventures, but only when it was felt that
the basic security of the nation was threatened or vital
international interests were at stake. Thus, the United States
was involved in the Spanish-American War and World War I. But
it always returned to its isolationist posture.
World War II ended America's isolationism. After the war,
it became painfully obvious that emerging political forces
and the atomic age would not allow the Americans to draw back
into their shell to await the next major crisis or conflagra-
tion. The quantum leap in technological advances and increased
7

speed of communications and transportation began to break
down the security barrier which had been provided by two
oceans. The United States now had a center-stage role in
the political drama that was unfolding throughout the world.
The Second World War not only thrust America into an
often unwanted role, it also changed many of the basic poli-
tical structures of the past. International boundary lines
were being redrawn and new maps would have to be printed to
reflect the many changes that occurred. The Second World War
resulted in a basic realignment in the world balance of power,
As time passed the world began to gravitate toward a major
bipolar balance, with the Soviet Union at one pole and the
United States at the other.
The new orientation of the world's political order
brought about a period of instability and uncertainty. The
world had to adjust to the political realities of the time.
As the chaos of war subsided, the world began to cleave along
two political and philosophical lines: communism and liberal
democracy.
Of all the things that evolved from the Second World War,
it was the increased power of the Soviet Union and the spread
of communism that threatened the United States the most. It
was also communism that was the most enigmatic dilemma for
America. Intuitively, many Americans began to believe that
communism jeopardized, if not immediately then eventually,
the very survival of the state. It was these beliefs and




Prior to the end of World War II, when it became apparent
that it was only a matter of time before the Third Reich col-
lapsed, and especially after the war, many diverse political
groups began to plan for their assumption of power in Europe.
It was the eventual and inevitable confrontation of these
diverse forces which led first to the cooling, and then to
the near severing, of relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union.
In the political vacuum and economic chaos caused by the
war, the Soviet Union saw an opportunity to further its own
goals and ambitions. The United States at the same time was
also working for the reestablishment of governments that were
in its best interests. Initially the Soviets were very suc-
cessful in spreading communism and installing regimes of
their choosing in some of the areas of Eastern Europe and the
Balkans.
The United States was not really prepared for what was
happening. The national leadership was not accustomed to
international involvement and the nuances of major global
power politics. There was no real or clear-cut policy to
deal with what was occurring. However, the leaders in Wash-
ington and London — America's major ally — knew that they
had to do something, short of starting another war, to stop
the actual and perceived threats being posed by the Russians.
Between 1944 and 1947, the United States tried almost on an
ad hoc basis to formulate a foreign policy to deal with
global political realities and stop the spread of communism.
The task of devising a foreign policy was difficult for the
9

United States because of the lack of a clear American under-
standing of, or consensus on, what was happening. The prob-
lems were compounded by the death of President Roosevelt
(April 12, 1945) and the installation of a new administration
in Washington, the electoral defeat of British Prime Minister
Churchill (July 26, 1945), and the intransigence of Stalin.
In the beginning the United States attempted to deal with
the Russians diplomatically and through negotiations. When
this failed to achieve the desired results, threats of eco-
nomic sanctions or the denial of economic assistance were
used to get the desired results. The use of economic sanc-
tions and the denial of economic assistance as a political
lever also failed. The U.S. Secretary of State tried to use
the atomic bomb as a political prod.* This also failed. The
United States finally devised a plan for containment. This
scheme appeared to work.
The American containment policy was the first clear-cut
*The United States did not directly threaten the Soviets
with the atomic bomb; rather U.S. negotiators used it as an
implied threat. For example, during the Council of Foreign
Ministers meeting in London in September, 1945, U.S. Secretary
of State James F. Byrnes is reported to have told Soviet For-
eign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov "if you don't cut out all
the stalling and let us get down to work, I am going to pull
an atomic bomb out of my hip pocket and let you have it." -^
Gar Alperovitz, in his book Atomic Diplomacy; Hiroshima and
Potsdam , effectively discusses the political and psychological
impact of the atomic bomb on the United States and the Soviet
Union. In the case of the U.S. the possession of this weapon
increased the stiffness of the American bargaining position
and reduced its willingness to negotiate. In the case of the
Soviets, the American monopoly of nuclear weapons added to
their feelings of insecurity and stiffened their resolve —
especially in light of the fact that the Soviets, at that




American foreign policy to be developed since the Monroe
Doctrine. Its purpose was to "contain" the expansion of
Soviet communism and thus reduce the threat to the security
of the United States. Containment became the linchpin of
American policy and was to remain as such until the advent
of detente in the early 1970 's.
If one were to select a date for the initiation of this
foreign policy, one might select March 12, 1947, the date
that President Harry S. Truman addressed the Congress of the
United States to ask for military and economic aid to save
Greece and Turkey from communism. It was this speech — which
embodied the Truman Doctrine — that launched the American
containment policy. Although President Truman did not mention
the Soviet Union in this speech, it was this address which
outlined the American program designed to stop the spread of
communism. The objectives of the program were clear, when
Truman said
I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free people who are resisting attempt-
ed subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work
out their destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through
economic and financial aid which is essential to econo-
mic stability and orderly political processes.
The free peoples of the world look to us for sup-
port in maintaining their freedoms.
If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the
peace of the world -and we shall surely endanger the
welfare of our own nation.
2
Today, it is widely believed that the Truman Doctrine
has outlived its usefulness and is no longer applicable to
11

contemporary international and American domestic political
realities. Nevertheless, it is held generally that without
the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. containment policy, plus the
massive, concomitant American monetary assistance, Greece
would have come under communist domination shortly after the
end of World War II. There* is, however, ample evidence to
indicate that the United States did not save Greece, rather
that Greece was "saved" by the Greeks and external events
that were beyond the control of America. It can even be
argued that the "democratic" forces in Greece did not win the
war, it was the communists who lost the war. Thus, the
effectiveness of the Truman Doctrine has often been errone-
ously perceived and its true value and impact often misjudged.
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, will be to examine
the impact of the Truman Doctrine on the Greek civil war.
The major goal will be to convince the reader that American
intervention with military and economic aid, beginning in
1947, was not the decisive factor in this particular war;
rather, other events and forces played the predominant roles
and ultimately determined the outcome of the conflict. But,
let there be no misunderstanding. The value and importance
of the Truman Doctrine is not automatically negated because
it did not save Greece from communism. Its significance and
meaning may lie elsewhere. The reader must be cautioned and
understand from the outset that criticism should not be mis-
taken for condemnation.
It is also appropriate for this introduction to point out
that this thesis does not purposefully attempt to represent
12

a deterministic approach to the Cold War. The information
provided is not intended for the purpose of arguing over who
was responsible for the Cold War. In this vein, two schools
of thought exist. The traditionalists represented by such
scholars as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Gaddis Smith, and
Herbert Feis, hold the Russians predominately responsible for
the Cold War. On the other hand, the revisionists, represent-
ed by men like William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, Gar
Alperovitz , and David Horowitz, place the blame on the United
States. This paper does not take issue with, or favor, either
side. It does not try to attach responsibility. This paper
merely deals with a single case study on the results and
nuances of a specific American foreign policy action.
Before attempting to answer the question of whether or
not the Truman Doctrine saved Greece, it is necessary to out-
line the circumstances which led to its application in Greece.
Consequently, it will be best to start by discussing the




II. BACKGROUND AND PRELUDE TO AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT
The Greeks rival the Jews in being the most poli-
tically minded race in the world. No matter how for-
lorn their circumstances or how grave the peril to
their country, they are always divided into many




Any student of Greece and modern Greek politics would be
well advised to start his studies by memorizing the above
quotation. It strikes at the very heart of the Greek poli-
tical psyche and goes a long way in explaining many of the
recent problems and catastrophes which have befallen Greece.
It is as appropriate today as it was at the beginning of the
Second World War.
Greece was hit by the full impact of fascist expansionism,
while the country was still under the dictatorial rule of
General John Metaxas. The Metaxas regime had been very de-
visive and harsh for the people of Greece; however, their
nightmare was just beginning. On October 28, 1940, Italy
attacked Greece. Greek resistance to Mussolini's forces was
stiff, and the Greek Army managed to stop the Italians and
push them back into Albania. Their victory was nevertheless
shortlived. On April 6, 1941, the Germans came to the aid of
their fascist allies and took up the battle for Greece. By
April 23, 1941, the Germans had won the battle for Greece
and an armistice was signed.
The Greek government and the King fled initially to
14

Crete — along with 48,000 of the 60,000 British soldiers who
4
had been sent to help the Greeks. By May 31, 1941, the gov-
ernment was forced to evacuate Crete and establish itself at
Cairo and then London.
The flight of the government caused the collapse of the
political structure of the country. The only thing that re-
mained of the army was a few battalions that were regrouped
in the Middle East. Greek sailors were left without ships,
and those who escaped later fought on vessels provided by the
British. The remaining airmen also fought later in British-
5
provided aircraft. Initially, all armed resistance to the
invaders ceased as the country began over three years of a
triple occupation by Germans, Italians and Bulgarians. (The
Germans occupied the urban centers of Athens-Piraeus and
Thessaloniki
,
plus the Aegean Islands and Crete. The Bulgar-
ians annexed portions of Macedonia and Thrace. The Italians
6
controlled the remaining area. )
As time passed the Greeks began to organize against the
occupiers. A number of resistance organizations sprang up,
and these forces managed to tie down ten to eleven German
7
divisions. The largest and most effective of the resistance
groups was the communist-led National Liberation Front
( Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon -EAM) and its military arm
the National People's Liberation Army ( Ethnikos Laikos
Apeleftherotikos Stratos -ELAS) . This group, although con-
trolled by communists, was made up of people from the entire
political spectrum who had banded together to fight a common
enemy. In addition, as noted by Daniel Yergin in his ex-
15

cellent book Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and
the National Security State , EAM-ELAS "won the support of
large segments of the working class and peasantry, portions
of the population that had traditionally been deprived of
8
political influence." EAM-ELAS forces operated throughout
the entire country.
The other important resistance group was the National
Democratic Greek Union (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellenikos
Stratos -EDES)
. This organization was led by a nationalist.
General Napoleon Zervas, and operated mostly in the Epirus
area in northwestern Greece just below the Albanian border.
In the beginning Britain's concern for tying down Axis
forces led it to supply both ELAS and EDES — with a prefer-
ance for ELAS. This support from London allowed ELAS to
build up a formidable military force which eventually grew
9
to number about 50,000 men.
The Greek resistance groups at first concentrated on
harassing the Germans and Italians by sabotaging communica-
tions and transportation lines and other critical installa-
tions. They focused their efforts on assisting the Allied
effort and their operations not only tied down critically
needed German troops but also disrupted supply shipments to
German forces in North Africa. By 1943, however, the focus
of ELAS operations began to change.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who was closely
monitoring events in Greece, recalled that: "The Italian
surrender in September, 1943, affected the whole balance of
forces in Greece. E.L.A.S. was able to acquire most of the
16

Italian equipment, including the weapons of an entire division
10
and thus gain military supremacy." EAM-ELAS believed that
the Italian surrender would mean that the German forces would
11
be withdrawn soon. This estimate led them to conclude that
the time had come to gain overall supremacy and, thus, estab-
lish themselves as the next government of Greece. ELAS forces
began to attack the other non-communist guerrilla groups, in-
cluding EDES. But the Germans did not withdraw. The British
reacted by suspending arms deliveries to ELAS and increasing
their deliveries to EDES. This fight between the guerrilla
groups marked the "first round" of the civil war and ended
after a truce had been arranged by the British in February
12
1944.
In September 1944, the German Army finally began to with-
draw from Greece.* The time had arrived for the British, the
exiled government, and the King to return. However, ELAS was
in control of the countryside and all of the major cities ex-
cept Athens. EAM-ELAS was in a position to finally take
control. But they were stopped by orders from the Kremlin.
According to the authors of the Area Handbook for Greece , the
Greek Communist Party ( Kommunistikon Komma Hellados -KKE)
was "ordered" by Moscow, through their military mission in
Greece, "to 'avoid opposition' and participate in the
13
Papandreou government." (George Papandreou had been select-
ed as the new Greek Prime Minister just prior to the return
*The Germans did not leave Athens until October 12,
1944, and it was not until late October that they had
evacuated the entire country.
17

of the exiled government.) This must have been a bitter pill
for the KKE leadership to swallow, but swallow it they did.
They acceded to Moscow's orders but demanded a share of the
political power, based on their "popular" support — estimated
14
initially at 700,000 — and military strength.
In late September 1944, EDES , ELAS and Greek Prime Min-
ister Papandreou met under the auspices and direction of the
15
British at Caserta, Italy. On September 26, 1944, an
agreement was signed which assured the return of the exiled
government. The guerrilla representatives pledged to place
themselves under the control of the Greek Government, and
Papandreou then put them all under the control of British
General Scobie. Scobie was charged with leading the Allies
back to Greece.
The Allies returned to a devastated and prostrated Greece
on October 15, 1944 — almost four years after the first
Italian attack. The price that the Greeks had paid for their
resistance was almost unbelievable. Some of the official
loss figures included
. . . war losses, 30,000 killed; dead through famine
360,000; executed by Germans and Italians, 43,000; exe-
cuted by Bulgarians, 25,000; hostages, 45,000; homeless,
1,200,000; towns, villages ruined, 3,700. By the end
of the war the Greek population was reduced by 7 percent
(estimated population of 7.5 million). . .
On the economic side, inflation scientifically
planned by the Germans ruined the monetary system.
. . . The damage to the industrial plant is estimated
at $40,000,000. The Greek merchant marine, which ranked
ninth in the world with a total of 1,697,986 tons was
the main source of the nations foreign exchange, was al-
most completely wiped out; over a million tons were sent
to the bottom. Rolling stock, too, was about totally
destroyed; about 60 percent of the railroad tracks, 60
18

percent of the telephones, 7 5 percent of the telegraph
wires and installations were wrecked. All big bridges
and tunnels, which can be replaced only at tremendous
cost, were utterly demolished, and 60 percent of the
roads were rendered impassable by demolition. Harbor
installations were destroyed in toto.16
Between the Axis Powers, the Allies and the Greek guerrillas,
the country had been almost totally destroyed.
Beyond the casualties and damaged listed above, a severe
blow had been given to the national psyche of the country.
The political and governmental organs were in shambles. There
was no political consensus, and the country was more politi-
cally divided than it had ever been before. Even with this
adversity the Greeks could not get together to agree on the
type of government and leadership they wanted. Communist,
republican, nationalist and monarchist forces were all vying
for power. Too much had happened for things to return to
"the way they were" overnight. There was no army and no
established law enforcement agencies left to insure public
order.
The worst problem facing Greece, however, was the distrust,
hatred and animosities that had been built up by the Greeks
against themselves. Family began to be pitted against family.
Brothers became hostile to one another. Charges of traitor,
murderer and collaborator became common as the Greeks began
to vent their frustrations and pent-up hostilities on each
other. The worst of the Greek character surfaced. Suspi-
ciousness and opportunism came to the fore. The Greeks
temporarily could unite to meet an external threat, but
now they were incapable of unifying themselves without that
19

external threat. The stage was set for the "second round" of
the civil war.
As mentioned above, the Caserta Agreement of September
1944 established a coalition government which included six
communist (EAM) ministers out of a total of eighteen. By
the time this government returned to Athens, however, the
polarization of forces had already begun to have an adverse
effect on Greece's political life. The main issues which
were beginning to cause trouble were the formation of a
national army and the disarming of the guerrilla bands. These
two bones of contention were complicated by strong disagree-
ments over the timing of national elections and the return of
the king.
The issue over the disarmament of guerrilla groups and
the formation of the army came to a head on December 2, 1944,
when the six communist ministers in the government resigned.
EAM now lost all desire to work in, or cooperate with, the
British-backed government. The Greek communist leadership
probably also gave up hope of taking over the reins of gov-
ernment by peaceful means. EAM-ELAS forces were still
effectively in control of all of Greece except for the capital.
They must have estimated that time would work against them
and that their powerful position would only decline. It was
also obvious to them that, if they turned in their weapons
and allowed an army to be organized, they might not be in a
position to take control in the future.
The walkout of the ministers on December 2 appears to
have been a pretext to precipitate a government crisis.
20

There is evidence that as early as November 28, 1944, the com-
munist leadership had already decided to use their military
17
force to seize Athens and thus gain control of all of Greece.
The match was set to the fuse by EAM when it called for
a demonstration in Constitution Square, the central park in
Athens, for December 3, and a general strike for the capital
for December 4 . These moves were planned to demonstrate the
communist's strength and possible to dissuade the British from
18
intervening in what was considered a Greek internal issue.
The truncated Greek Government tried to stop the planned dem-
onstration by cordoning off the streets leading to Constitution
Square. The police cordon did not hold. When the crowd
managed to break through, shots were fired by the police at
the advancing mob and the "second round" of the Greek civil
war had started.
The fight for Athens was bloody and brutal. The commu-
nists moved forcefully to liquidate the existing police and
military forces. They also began indiscriminately to
massacre suspected German "collaborators" and innocent ci-
vilians. EAM began almost systematically to kill their
opposition. However, they were guerrillas used to employing
hit-and-run tactics. They were not accustomed to city
fighting, and they had not anticipated that the British would
react as they did.
Winston Churchill had clearly decided that he would not
allow Greece to fall to the communist-led guerrillas. Con-
sequently, he ordered General Scobie to use all prudent
means to put down the insurrection. Churchill's instruc-
21

tions to Scobie stated in part: "Do not however hesitate to
act as if you were in a conquered city where a local rebellion
is in progress. . . We have to hold and dominate Athens. It
would be a great thing for you to succeed in this without
19
bloodshed if possible, but also with bloodshed if necessary."
Following Churchill's guidance, the British reacted with
force and also ordered military reinforcements sent from the
battle front in Italy. The communists' inability to take the
city quickly allowed these reinforcements to arrive in time
to play a decisive role in saving Athens. The fighting
lasted for over a month, but the British troops finally
managed to drive the guerrillas from Athens, and a truce was
signed on January 11, 1945. Britain had saved Greece from
falling under the rule of a communist government.
Prior to the truce, Winston Churchill and his foreign
secretary visited Greece to try to cool down the situation.
Churchill managed to arrange for the installation of a new
government. In addition, he persuaded King George II to
delay his return to Greece and to name a regent. Archbishop
Damaskinos, who was highly respected by both sides. The
installation of the new government, and the decision by the
King not to return until a plebiscite was held, helped relieve
some of the tensions and assisted greatly in arranging for
the truce.
The end of the "second round" was formalized by the
20
signing of the Varkiza Agreement on February 12, 1945. . The
agreement established the guidelines for the normalization of
political processes, including a call for elections and a
22

plebiscite on the status of the King. It also called for the
disarming of all guerrilla bands, the formation of a national
army and amnesty for political but not common crimes.
Unfortunately for the Greeks, the Varkiza Agreement did
not cauterize the wounds of the Nazi occupation or the "first"
and "second rounds" of the civil war. It served to set the
course for the "third" and final round of the civil war.
In analyzing the first two rounds of the civil war, it
is important to remember that not all of the people who
belonged to EAM-ELAS were hard-core communists. Many, if not
most, were not communists at all. There is no doubt that
the leadership was made up of "card-carrying" party members
of the KKE, but the general membership of EAM-ELAS included
bandits, those disgruntled with the system, peasants who had
been duped into believing they were helping their country,
and those who had joined the resistance to fight the Nazis.
In addition, EAM-ELAS had camouflaged its communist image
during the Second World War. However, by the end of the
"second round" there was no doubt that EAM-ELAS was an
indigenous communist movement determined to establish a
leftist dictatorship in Greece.
During that era, not too many people understood the true
nature of this — and other — national liberation movements.
The Greeks were no exception. The political turmoil and
upheaval was not seen as a growing trend of changing poli-
tical forces and governments. Monarchies were on their way
out. Old, traditional forms of government did not meet the
challenges of the day. In many areas the old systems were no
23

longer satisfying the increasing political demands and awak-
ening of the minority and, in some cases majority groups,
that were trying to change the systems of government in their
countries
.
With the signing of the Varkiza Agreement, the guerrilla
bands began to disarm. It was not, though, total disarmament.
Many citizens, regardless of their political leanings, kept
their weapons. ELAS forces turned in many of their guns, but
they did not turn them all in. Most of their better weapons
were hidden in the countryside. It is not clear if at that
time the intent of hiding these weapons was to await
"another day" to fight or was intended as insurance for self-
protection. Regardless of the motives, ELAS did manage to
put away a large number of weapons and ammunition which would
be used at a later date.
In moving to a discussion of the next phase of the Greek
civil war, it should be noted that the exact roots of the
'I
"third round" are hard to divine. There are those who blame
the communists for continuing their quest for power. There
are those who blame right-wing politicians and their purge
and persecution of the left. It is often necessary and
important to assign culpability to one side or the other.
In certain situations it is important to identify specific
individuals as the culprits. However, for the purposes in-
tended here, it is not vital or necessary to attach the total
or specific blame to anyone. It is probably more important
to understand the underlying causes.
The "third round" of the civil war was the result of the
24

convoluted nature of the Greek body politic. It had its
beginnings in the ongoing Greek search for a satisfactory
governmental system of the majority. It was nurtured by the
free-spirited and independent nature of the Hellenic citizen-
ry. It was inflamed by political ideologies of the left and
right that were alien and, at the same time, natural. It
was not conceived in Moscow or London. It was born in the
minds of Plato, Marx, et al. Couloumbis, Petropulos and
Psomiades — astute students of this period — perceptively
observe that "Both sides of the Greek fratricidal conflict
can be faulted for soliciting or acquiescing to foreign
sponsorship and the resultant foreign intervention. The
additional fault of the Greek communists may have been that
they relied, short-sightedly , on the support of patrons who
21
had quietly bargained them away at the conference table."
The "second round" of the civil war caused the final
polarization of political forces and detrimentally submerged
the centrists and moderates. An almost natural backlash
against the left began to develop, mostly as a result of the
communists' ruthless tactics. The government, the nascent
army and the disorganized police forces were now increasingly
falling into the hands of the right. The rightists moved to
purge the government of leftists and those who were believed
to be "soft" on the left. The purge soon gained momentum
and the semblance of an inquisition. Many "leftists" lost
their jobs. Right-wing civilian groups soon took the law in-
to their own hands and began to harass, attack and kill those
Greeks that they could get their hands on who had been, were,
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could have been, or were related to, a communist, leftist,
or communist sympathizer. The police were most often in
sympathy with the attackers and more often than not turned
their heads the other way, while the right took its turn at
vengence. The rightists now had the upper hand and zealously
sought their revenge as they unleashed a "white terror."
The time for reconciliation passed quickly and countless
communists, criminals and the persecuted took to the moun-
tains to save their lives. The exodus from the towns and
cities to the mountains was a time-honored tradition for the
Greeks. Historically, the flight to the mountains and the
pursuit of banditry had occurred in the past when individuals
or groups were persecuted or they found life in the urban
areas dangerous. The often indiscriminate actions of the
right consequently caused many to follow this almost instinc-
tive course and helped increase the political problems.
The British in the meantime were pushing to normalize
political activity and institutions. Parliamentary elections
were called for and held on March 31, 1946. Unfortunately
the communists, as a sign of protest, decided to abstain from
the voting, and this further isolated them from political
participation. The election, which was monitored by an
allied commission (American, British and French observers)
,
clearly showed a swing to the right as the conservatives
gained a majority. In September 1946, a plebiscite was held
on the issue of the return of the king. The electorate voted
22
by 68.9 percent in favor of King George II 's return.
The political isolation and strategic loss of strength
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of the left forced the hand of the communists. Evidence
indicates that at least by February 1946, the KKE decided to
launch the "third round" of the civil war and make a final
23
Putsch to control Greece. By early 1946 sporadic guerrilla
attacks on isolated areas and villages began. The final
round of the civil war had started.
A blow-by-blow, detailed description of the guerrilla
war which followed is more properly left for another medium.
For the purpose intended here, the Greek war between 1946
and 1949 can be succinctly described as a classic guerrilla
war. The communists initially employed hit-and-run tactics
against small and isolated locations. The only government
forces able to meet the threat were the gendarmerie units
which were not equipped, organized or trained to fight the
guerrillas. The "new" Greek Army still did not exist.
As time went on the communists increased the size and
frequency of their activities, steadily increasing the threat
to the government in Athens. This activity centered mainly
in the Peloponnesus and the Macedonia-Epirus areas.
After the signing of the Varkiza Agreement many of the
communists had sought refuge in the bordering communist-
ruled states of Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These new-
ly established communist governments willingly provided
sanctuary and encouragement to the Greek guerrillas. As the
KKE's activities increased, these countries — especially
Yugoslavia — became more involved in supplying, feeding,




The KKE could not have picked a better time to launch its
"war of national liberation," in view of the situation in
Athens. The Greek Government was not prepared to fight a
demoralizing and taxing guerrilla war. Despite Allied and
United Nations' aid, the country was still economically
devastated. The war sapped the available resources for re-
covery and, as Greeks fled from the "red terror," the finan-
cial burden of feeding the increasing numbers of refugees
multiplied. The country could not be rebuilt under these
circumstances — the guerrillas were capable of destroying
things as fast as the government could build them. By the
end of 1946, the guerrillas appeared to be on the road to
victory.
At this time also Britain, the Greek protector, began to
feel the strains of World War II and the expense of empire.
In addition, the British were experiencing a very harsh
winter which further damaged their economic situation. With
every day that passed, it became more obvious that the British
could not support their presence in the Eastern Mediterranean
and Greece. It was under these circumstances that the British
and the Greeks turned to the United States for salvation.
The United States would have to be the deus ex machina . Who
else could save Greece and replace the British?
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III. WHY THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE? WHY GREECE?
The Truman Doctrine was generally perceived as the Ameri-
can counterbalance to communism, and more specifically, So-
viet efforts to dominate as many countries as possible so
that they could achieve global hegemony. However, viewed
from another vantage point, the Truman Doctrine can also be
seen as the result of an American inertial mementum to pro-
tect and support the liberal democratic philosophy that
served as the ideological foundation for the United States.
It was a program which represented the deeply-rooted Ameri-
can belief in "government by the governed" and opposition to
minority rule by the right, center, or left. It was an ex-
tension of the Wilsonian tradition of self-determination of
nations and their peoples. The decision to aid Greece was
an instinctive, natural reflex action supported by the
genetic makeup of the American body politic.
The role of American ideology and political philosophy
should not be disregarded when trying to understand the
Truman Doctrine. Liberal democratic precepts and beliefs
did affect the decisions of American policy-makers. There
was within the administration an innate sense of what was
right and what was wrong. Nevertheless, there has been a
tendency to focus on the selfish motives of U.S. decision-
makers and view their policies with a cynical eye. The dis-
cussion below will center its attention on these selfish
motivations (e.g., national security); with a clear under-
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standing that liberal democratic philosophies did subtly
affect the formulation and implementation of the Truman Doc-
trine.
The seeds of the Truman Doctrine were planted during the
Second World War, and it was in 1945 and 1946 that they began
to germinate. As previously noted, by late 1946 the British
began to feel the economic strain of their global commitments.
It was becoming increasingly apparent that they would not be
able to sustain much of their foreign presence, if their
economy was not to be destroyed. And yet, the British prob-
ably estimated that if they withdrew their forces and
economic-military assistance in Greece that a vacuum would be
created. Based on their observations of what had happened
and was happening in Europe and elsewhere, the British were
probably convinced that this void would be filled by the
Soviet Union. The British understanding of what was occur-
ring was clearly outlined by Sir Winston Churchill in his
famous "Iron Curtain" speech which he delivered in Fulton,
Missouri, on March 5, 1946 — almost exactly one year before
the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. In the speech
Churchill warned of the spread of communism and the need for
the Western nations to deal with the problem from a position
of strength. The Greek situation fit nicely within the con-
24
text of Churchill's comments. An increase in Russian
presence and possible resulting dominance in the Eastern
Mediterranean would surely mean a major shift in the balance
of power. This shift could result in the eventual communist




In late 1946 and early 1947 messages to Washington from
the U.S. Embassy in Athens began to paint a very alarming
picture of the situation in Greece. U.S. Ambassador Lincoln
MacVeagh; Paul Porter, the Chief of the American Economic
Mission to Greece; and Mark Ethridge, the U.S. representa-
tive on the United Nations commission investigating border
violations in Greece, began to see that Greece was on the
edge of a precipice. By the middle of February 1947, sub-
sequently declassified State Department messages reveal,
MacVeagh, Porter and Ethridge were convinced that the coun-
try was on the verge of collapse. These men also believed
that the Soviet Union was directly involved in fomenting the
revolution. By that time, suspected Russian involvement alone
would have been enough to send chills up the spines of Ameri-
can decision-makers. But the diplomatic cables emanating
from Greece went much farther than that. One of the messages
sent by Ethridge from Athens warned: "Soviets feel that
25
Greece is ripe plum to fall into their hands in a few weeks."
The reports from Greece worried the U.S. Department of
State. These reports, coupled with American knowledge that
the British might have to cut back on their support to Greece,
caused deep concern. Policy-makers had already started think-
ing that they might have to do something in the immediate
future. The Export- Import Bank had provided limited credits
26
to help support Greece. U.S. Ambassador MacVeagh and
Paul Porter of the American Economic Mission had already
27
recommended U.S. financial assistance for Greece. As far
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back as the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 the United States
28
had begun considering the provision of aid to Greece. Daniel
Yergin, the noted author of Shattered Peace , also mentions
that Greece was on the top of the list of potential economic
crises which had been prepared by the Department of State
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early in February 1947. Consequently, the bad news that
was coming did not catch the Americans totally off balance.
In February 1947, the British Government finally decided
that it had to pull out of Greece. Its growing economic
problems had been exacerbated by a particularly harsh winter
and, although the British did not want to leave Greece, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Hugh Dalton, finally con-
vinced the government that it had no choice. Along with
this decision to withdraw, Dalton reportedly convinced His
Majesty's Government "to present the matter in Washington
in such a manner as to incite the Americans to assume that
30
[GreelO responsibility."
There was no need to "incite" the United States. The
U.S. bureaucracy was already primed to take action. Never-
theless, it was not prepared for the short notice that it
received, which turned a serious problem into an immediate
crisis. The United States was officially notified on Feb-
ruary 21, 1947, of the British decision to terminate support
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for Greece on March 31, 1947.
The American reaction to this notification must be viewed
in the overall context of U.S. foreign policy perspectives
and the international developments subsequent to the end of
the Second World War. It cannot be overemphasized that there
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was a very clear belief in Washington that the spread of com-
munism and Soviet political and military moves threatened U.S.
national security. As has been previously mentioned, differ-
ent methods had been tried to stop the Russians, but nothing
had apparently worked. Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe
and perceived communist initiatives had put enough pressure
on the leaders in the American capital to push them toward
the belief that something definitely had to be done. No more
ground could be given up. No more countries could be allowed
to fall under the communist yoke. Reitzel, Kaplan, and
Coblenz, writing about U.S. foreign policy between 1945 and
1955, capture American perceptions at this time:
In brief, the Soviet Union was by its actions pre-
senting itself as an expansionist state, unremitting in
its efforts to seize every opportunity that opened to
create fresh advantage for itself. It appeared unreli-
able in its interpretation of its international pledges,
and to be fostering disintegration in the international
system while advocating the need for great power unity.
Above all, it appeared to be renewing the thesis of
world revolution that its wartime allies hoped had been
abandoned. 3 2
Since 1945 Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and
Yugoslavia had fallen prey to communism. Hungary and
Czechoslovakia were on the brink. Communists were part of
the governing coalitions in France and Italy, and there was
great concern that these two countries might also fall under
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Moscow's domination. The Kremlin had been pressuring
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Turkey for territorial and other concessions since 1945.
It was not known if Turkey could resist the Soviet overtures
without help, especially after the reduction of British
forces from the Eastern Mediterranean. The Russians had
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maintained troops in Iran, in violation of previous agreements
;
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until March 24, 1946. The situation in China was also tense.
The spread of communism and apparent Russian ambitions seemed
to have gone beyond the point of merely challenging the vital
interests of the United States and its allies. The planned
British withdrawal from Greece, under the circumstances, was
seen as opening the way for an even greater, unchecked ex-
pansion of Soviet influence and power, for communist govern-
ment and Soviet domination were seen as identical.
General Walter Bedell Smith, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow
at the time, had informed Washington that "only the presence
of British troops had so far saved Greece from being swallow-
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ed in the Soviet orbit." There seemed to be no choice.
America had to take immediate action to save Greece and
Turkey from Stalin.
In moving to bolster the Greek regime, the Truman Admin-
istration was confronted with several major obstacles which
had to be overcome. The government was primarily faced with
convincing the Congress that Greece was on the verge of
falling into communist hands. This would not be easy, in
light of the fact that the legislative branch was dominated
by opposition-party Republicans. And, since the Wilson era,
the Republicans had been consistently more isolationist than
the Democrats. During the 1946 elections the Republicans had
won in the Senate by a margin of fifty-one to forty-five and
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in the House by 245 to 118. In addition, there was a
pervasive sentiment in the Congress to reduce defense and




proposed budget was being threatened. There were also
still some powerful congressmen who harbored isolationist
tendencies. These congressmen did not want to get involved
in any foreign ventures.
Another major problem facing the Truman Administration
was the American public. In February 1946, sixty-three per-
cent of those polled by George Gallup approved of the job
that President Truman was doing, while twenty-two percent
disapproved and fifteen percent had no opinion. By January
1947, a similar Gallup poll revealed that only thirty-five
percent of those questioned approved of the President's per-
formance, while forty-seven percent disapproved and eighteen
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percent had no opinion. Domestic issues more than foreign
had eroded Truman's popular support; however, this erosion
limited the Administration's foreign policy options and its
flexibility. The United States had just concluded a major
war. There was no popular desire to become enmeshed in
another. There was no calling for involvement in foreign
ventures which might lead to war.
A third dilemma was that President Truman was quickly
losing the military force that would be necessary if a con-
frontation with the Soviets developed. At the end of the
Second World War the American armed forces consisted of 8.3
million men. The immediate desire of those troops, and the
American public in general, was to return to normalcy. Black
and Helmreich note that "... the American government
readily acceded to the popular demand for a rapid demobiliza-




1.4 million men in uniform.
The administration moved swiftly to overcome the obsta-
cles. It started with Congress. There was unanimity in the
bureaucracy over what actions to take. Now the senators and
representatives had to be convinced, and in order to persuade
them a very grim picture was painted. On February 27, 1947,
during a briefing at the White House — which had been called
to inform the Congressional leadership about the Greek
crisis — Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson recalled that
he presented the problem to " . . . all the majority and
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minority potentates except Senator Taf t ..." Acheson
told them
In the past eighteen months, . . . , Soviet pressure
on the Straits ODardanellesU , on Iran, and on northern
Greece had brought the Balkans to the point where a
highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open three
continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel
infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece
would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also
carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt,
and to Europe through Italy and France, already threaten-
ed by the strongest domestic Communist parties of Western
Europe. The Soviet Union was playing one of the greatest
gambles in history at minimal cost ... We and we alone
were in a position to break up the play. These were the
stakes that British withdrawal from the eastern Mediter-
ranean offered to an eager and ruthless opponent. 42
Acheson 's briefing set the tone of the administration's
argument and worked effectively in convincing many members of
the congressional leadership that the United States had to
act. In order to gain the support of the American public and
the remainder of the Congress, President Truman went before
a joint session of that body on March 12, 1947, to ask for
economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey. The speech
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launched the American "containment" foreign policy.* As
President Truman noted later in his memoirs, "This was
America's answer to the surge of expansion of Communist
tyranny . . . This was, . . . , the turning point in Ameri-
ca's foreign policy, which now declared that wherever
aggression, direct or indirect, threatened the peace, the
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security of the United States was involved."
Truman's address to the Congress was clearly intended to
garner support for the proposed action and, to paraphrase a
statement reportedly made by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg
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concerning the speech, "scared hell out of the country."
The congressional address was plainly designed for domestic
rather than foreign consumption. John Lewis Gaddis, who has
written extensively about this period, says that the " . . .
Truman Doctrine constituted a form of shock therapy: it was
a last-ditch effort by the Administration to prod Congress
and the American people into accepting the responsibilities
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of the world leadership ..." The government's approach
worked, and on May 22, 1947, President Truman signed Public
Law 75, an Act to Provide Assistance to Greece and Turkey.
On June 20, 1947, the required agreement was signed with
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Greece.
In their determination to become involved in Greece and
*This policy was authored by George F. Kennan , who was
then the Director of the Policy, Planning Staff, at the
Department of State. He had written: "... it is clear
that the main element of any United States policy toward
the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but 47
firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."
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end American isolationist tendencies. President Truman and
his top advisers took a calculated risk. There was no guar-
antees of success. If the policy and program failed, the
administration would have been in grave trouble with the
Congress and the public. Nevertheless, Greece provided a
fateful and perhaps unique opportunity. Greece, unlike
Eastern Europe, was clearly situated within the geographic
realm of American strategic interests in the Mediterranean
and the Middle East. If Greece fell, Turkey would be caught
in a vise and the Soviets would probably gain unlimited ac-
cess to the Mediterranean and could thus place a wedge
between American and Western interests in Europe and the
Middle East. The decision to aid Greece was also simplified
by the fact that there were no Russian forces in the country
and that the country did not share a common border with the
Soviet Union. In addition, historically, the Greeks had
never posed, nor did they pose, a threat to the Soviet Union.
The solution to the problem, as envisioned, also did not
involve the deployment of American forces. And the chances
for success looked good.
The Soviets had previously appeared impervious to other
American actions and policies. Greece provided the United
States with the perfect opportunity to try a new approach
without the risk of an immediate or direct Soviet-American
confrontation, which could result in war. But, was it
American aid and the Truman Doctrine that "saved" Greece?
Was the Kremlin masterminding the war in Greece? And why
did the communists lose?
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These three questions serve as a key for analyzing and
understanding the Greek civil war. At the same time, the
answers to them provide a great deal of insight into the
Cold War, Soviet-American relations, and contemporary prob-
lems. They may also provide useful lessons for the future.




IV. SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE GREEK CIVIL WAR
The formulation and implementation of the Truman Doctrine
was predicated on the belief that communism was monolithic.
Major policy-makers in Washington and London were convinced
that the civil war in Greece was part of a centrally directed
communist plot to enslave Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
The rebellion in Greece was seen as part of a master plan
which had been spawned and was being directed by the Kremlin.
Preconceived beliefs did not allow the principal leaders to
see the true character of what was happening in Greece.
What was actually occurring in Greece was that the country
was beleaguered by Greek Marxist socialist insurgents and not
a Russian internationalist, Marxist group.
Just prior to the Americans assuming the role of principal
protectors of Greece in 1947, U.S. diplomatic messages be-
tween Athens and Washington clearly demonstrated the fear
that if the communist-led forces took over Greece they would
be subservient to Moscow. President Truman, U.S. Secretary
of State George C. Marshall, Under Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, U.S. Ambassador to Greece Lincoln MacVeagh, and
others appear to have been convinced that Russia was ultimate-
ly responsible for the war. They believed, as President
Truman stated himself, that "Under Soviet direction, . . . ,
Greece's northern neighbors — Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and






Despite these fears and the reports emanating from Greece,
there was evidence that the Soviets were not totally subsi-
dizing or even instigating the communists in Greece. Informa-
tion available today further supports the thesis that the
Soviets were keeping their hands off Greece. According to
Daniel Yergin, "The Greek crisis was basically a domestic
affair of long standing compounded by Balkan tensions and
rivalries. The Soviet Union not only did not cause or aggra-
vate the Greek situation but apparently disapproved of the
Communist rebellion and instructed the Greek Communist Party
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to refrain from resorting to violent tactics."
Analysis of Soviet "expansionist" activity just prior to,
and after, the Second World War reveals a pattern. The So-
viet Union undertook decisive actions in those states that
it had considered vital to the defense of Russia, and moved
to create a defensive buffer zone in t;he areas that had
historically been hostile or had been used as invasion routes
into the Soviet Union. It can be argued that Russian actions
were not motivated primarily by a desire to spread communism
but by a feeling of insecurity and a desire to protect their
country. This overriding consideration for security pushed
them to support, sponsor, and install forces and governments
in Eastern Europe that would be, at least, friendly toward
them. Obviously, communist governments would be more reliable
and preferable than western-oriented democracies or dictator-
ships of the right.
The expansion of Soviet influence and power in to Eastern
Europe and the Balkans was not done, however, without concern
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for the interests and positions of the United States and Great
Britain. In the negotiations and talks conducted by Stalin,
Churchill and Roosevelt, the concept of spheres of influence
emerged as one of the central themes. The restructuring of
a balance of power was clearly a goal of the Great Powers.
The precise nature of the spheres of influence might not have
been agreed upon exactly by the three leaders, but there is
little doubt that they were in agreement over the need to
"carve up" the world into balanced spheres of power and
influence. Barton Bernstein comments that at least in the
eyes of the Russians, Franklin Roosevelt acceded " (reluctant-
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ly) to a division of Europe." Bernstein also observes
that the United States sanctioned the armistice agreements




In establishing spheres of influence, Greece was un-
mistakably assigned to the British. "With the tacit approval
of the United States, Churchill met in Moscow [with Stalin]
on October 9, 1944, and informally carved up the Balkan map
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..." This meeting and what transpired during the meeting
was described by Churchill, when he wrote
The moment was apt for business, so I said, 'Let us
settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies
are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions,
and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in
small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned,
how would it do for you to have ninety per cent pre-
dominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of
the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?'
















I pushed this across to Stalin, who had heard the trans-
lation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his
blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed
it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than
it takes to set down. 53
The Russian agreement to give the British predominance
in Greece was probably more realistic and pragmatic than it
was magnanimous. Possibly as early as 1943, the Soviets may
have decided to abandon the Greek communists. "In July, 1943,
eight Soviet officers arrived at ELAS headquarters to assess
the prospects of the guerrillas." The Soviet military mission
reported that ELAS was "just a rabble of armed men not worth
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supporting." For the remainder of the Nazi occupation the
Greek communists' request for Soviet aid was ignored.
Beside the Kremlin's lack of interest in their Greek
"comrades," Stalin was well aware of the historical ties be-
tween Great Britain and Greece. In addition, the British
had come to Greece ' s aid when they were invaded by Axis
forces. London had had representatives in Greece advising
and fighting with the guerrillas. The British had supplied
the partisans during the Axis occupation. The Greek Govern-
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ment in exile had been under Great Britain's protection and
supervision. During this time the Greek communists had no
real or significant contact with Moscow. Stalin probably
also appreciated Greece's geographic importance to the Brit-
ish. If England lost Greece, its lines of communication to
the Middle East and beyond would be adversely affected, to
say the least. Thus, Stalin was probably not concerned about
letting the British have Greece and in the process gain some
leverage or concessions in other areas which he felt were
more important to the Soviet Union. In addition, the Greek
communists would not be the first or the last communists to
be sacrificed by Stalin. Richard Barnet aptly observes that
despite the Marxist-Leninist internationalist rhetoric,
"... the Soviet attitude toward Greece conformed perfect-
ly to the Stalinist pattern. Since the Greek guerrillas had
taken action independent of the Red army and Stalin's di-
rection, the Kremlin viewed them as a nuisance and a possible
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threat to the diplomatic relations of the Soviet Union."
The aforementioned discussion between Churchill and Stalin
is not enough, however, to conclude that the Russians were
not interested in placing Greece within the Soviet orbit.
Stalin could have changed his mind later, or he could have
seen an opportunity developing which he could exploit to his
advantage. Nevertheless, available information and Soviet
actions indicate that Stalin held to his October 1944 agree-
ment on Greece.
Prior to the "infamous" October meeting in Moscow, the
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Russians had occupied Bulgaria. Bulgarian forces were
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still in Greek Thrace at this time and the Soviets could have
taken advantage of this situation to further their territorial
hold on at least part of Greece and gain, for Bulgaria, di-
rect access to the Aegean and hence the Mediterranean Sea.
The Russians, however, did not take advantage of the situation.
In fact, during the Moscow meetings, on October 10, 1944, So-
viet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and British Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden discussed Bulgaria
and the fact that Bulgarian forces had placed British officers
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in Greek Thrace under house arrest. Eden relates that he
objected to this development and the next day Molotov told
him that the Russians would "summon ^he} Bulgars out of
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Greece ..." The Soviets followed through with their word
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and reportedly ordered the Bulgarians to evacuate Greek soil.
In addition, the armistice that was signed on October 28, 1944,
between the Russians and the Bulgarians "stated that all
territories gained by Bulgaria since 1941 would be surrender-
ee
ed . "
As previously described, in December 1944, Greek communist-
led rebels tried to overthrow the recently established govern-
ment. The British moved military reinforcements into Greece
to put down this "second round" of the civil war. The bloody
battle for Athens, and other major cities, resulted in signif-
icant damage and casualties to the already prostrate country.
The swiftness and ferocity of the British military reac-
tion to the communist attack against Athens drew considerable
criticism in England and America. As Churchill later wrote:
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The vast majority of the American press violently
condemned our action, which they declared falsified the
cause for which they had gone to war . . . Stalin how-
ever adhered strictly and faithfully to our agreement
of October, and during all the long weeks of fighting
the Communists in the streets of Athens not one word
of reproach came from Pravda or Isvestia.61
Silence in the Soviet press was not the only support the
Russians gave to the British suppression of the "second"
communist uprising. During at least one truce meeting in
Athens in December 1944, between all the Greek and allied
parties concerned, the head of the Soviet military mission
in Greece, Colonel Popov, sat on the British side of the
table. As Anthony Eden later recalled: "... Colonel
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Popov's uniform no doubt had its effect."
Then again, on April 24, 1945, in a message to Churchill
discussing the allied problems in Poland, Stalin wrote:
Poland is to the security of the Soviet Union what
Belgium and Greece are to the security of Great Britain.
. . . I do not know whether a genuinely representative
Government has been established in Greece, or whether
the Belgian Government is a genuinely democratic one.
The Soviet Union was not consulted when those Govern-
ments were being formed, nor did it claim the right
to interfere in those matters, because it realises how
important Belgium and Greece are to the security of
Great Britain. I cannot understand why in discussing
Poland no attempt is made to consider the interests of
the Soviet Union in terms of security as well.^^
Regardless of what Stalin said, the "third round" of the
Greek civil war began in 1946. With this new round came re-
ports of Soviet complicity and renewed suspicions of Soviet
involvement. Yet, no firm evidence exists to support the
claims that Stalin had gone back on his word. There is
information to indicated that he did not.
In February 1948, two high Yugoslav communist officials
46

— Edvard Kardelj and Milovan Djilas — met with Stalin and
Bulgarian officials to discuss a Balkan alliance. During
this meeting, in Stalin's Kremlin office, Djilas recounts:
Stalin . . . turned to the uprising in Greece: 'The
uprising in Greece has to fold up ... Do you believe,'
— he turned to Kardelj — 'in the success of the up-
rising in Greece?
'
Kardelj replies, 'If foreign intervention does
not grow and if serious political and military errors
are not made.
'
Stalin went on, without paying attention to
Kardelj 's opinion: 'If, ifl No, they have no prospect
of success at all. What do you think that Great
Britain and the United States — the United States,
the most powerful state in the world — will permit
you to break their line of communication in the
Mediterranean Seal Nonsense. And we have no navy.
The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as
quickly as possible. ^'^
The Russian attitude toward Greece was not altruistic.
They were realistic in their moves to dominate Eastern Europe
and certain Balkan countries. There were specific areas
where they had determined they would not compromise — areas
which were likely to be given up by the United States and
Great Britain (i.e., Poland and portions of Germany). There
were areas that they were willing to give up. Marshal Stalin's
feelings toward the Greek civil war may also have been in-
fluenced by the "gunboat" diplomacy that was being used by
the United States. As he told Djilas "... we have no navy.'
His sensitivity to the lack of a navy was most likely prompted
by the fact that he could not counter the American naval
presence in the Mediterranean. In February 1946, as a sign
of American resolve and support for Turkey, U.S. Secretary of
the Navy, James V. Forres tal "arranged to have the body of
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the Turkish ambassador, , . . , taken home on the Quss]
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Missouri, the largest battleship of the fleet ..."
During 1947, the United States sent to the Mediterranean
"an additional two aircraft carriers, seven cruisers, eight
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destroyers, and four other military vessels." Stalin, no
doubt, was painfully aware of the American naval activity,
and he was not in a position to confront or counter it.
Looking back on Soviet actions it becomes clear that,
generally speaking, they pushed for the advantage in areas
that they had militarily liberated from the Nazis and where
they had maintained military forces. However, Stalin prob-
ably understood that in some areas, such as Iran, he would
have to withdraw because Russian presence and domination
would be totally unacceptable to the West. Above all, the
Soviets tried to avoid a military confrontation with the
United States. Besides their desire to avoid direct military
confrontations, they also were not going to attack and use
military force to enter new areas. According to George
Kennan ; "It was perfectly clear to anyone with even a
rudimentary knowledge of the Russia of that day (l947[] that
the Soviet leaders had no intention of attempting to advance
their cause by launching military attacks with their own
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forces across frontiers."
The British military presence in Greece probably did a
great deal to suppress any desire that the Soviets might have
had to exploit the situation in Greece. The massive American




Another interesting theory as to why the Soviets stayed
out of Greece has been put forth by Milovan Djilas. In his
book Conversations with Stalin , he writes:
Not even today am I clear on the motives that caused
Stalin to be against the uprising in Greece. Perhaps
he reasoned that the creation in the Balkans of still
another Communist state — Greece — in circumstances
when not even the others were reliable and subservient,
could hardly have been in his interest, not to speak
of possible international implications, which were
assuming an increasingly threatening shape and could,
if not drag him into war, then endanger his already-
won positions. 68
Stalin's desire to see an end to the Greek insurgency can
also be viewed from another perspective. The reduction of
the American presence and influence in Europe and the Balkans
would have been in the Kremlin's best interests. Once the
Americans had drawn back to their continental "redoubt,"
previous experience would have led to the belief that it
would take a major crisis to draw them back out. The sub-
stantial withdrawal of American forces from the European
continent would make it more difficult for the United States
to reassert itself at a later date. The United States'
monopoly on nuclear weapons could have also led to a false
sense of security. Possession of the atomic bomb, hypo-
thetically, could have led to a reduced reliance on conven-
tional forces and thus negate the need for the stationing of
a large conventional force overseas.
If the United States, on its own volition — or with a
little coaxing — were to withdraw from Europe, there would
be no one left to challenge the Soviets. Therefore, it can
be argued that it would have behooved the Kremlin to exercise
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restraint and take prudent actions which would hasten an
American disentanglement in Europe. The rebellion in Greece
could only heighten Washington's concern, and at a minimum,
increase the time it would take to get the Americans out.
More importantly, the Greek war could have resulted in an
increased American presence in Europe and the introduction
of a sizeable American military force in the Balkans. Any
situation which could draw U.S. forces into southeast Europe
was definitely not in the interest of the Soviet Union;
consequently, a Greek communist rebellion at that time was
also not beneficial for Stalin.
We do not have the official Soviet documents or testimony
to know exactly what the Russian position was toward Greece.
However, a review of a great deal of the literature on the
Greek civil war supports the contention that Greece's Balkan
neighbors, and not the Soviet Union, supported the communist
insurrection. Even the report of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on International Relations notes that,
during the congressional hearings on aid to Greece and Turkey
and the Truman Doctrine, " . . . at no time were any of the
descriptions of Russian behavior or motivation subjected to
rigorous questioning ... In fact, the administration did
not provide any evidence of direct Russian aid to the CGreek]
rebels. On the contrary, Stalin seemed content to use
Greece as a convenient foil to parry Western criticism of
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Soviet actions in eastern and central Europe."
If the evidence provided above — that the Soviets were
not behind the civil war in Greece — is accepted, then it
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can be concluded that the Truman Doctrine was not necessary.
The explicit purpose of the "Doctrine" was to stop the Soviet
domination of Greece and the spread of "monolithic," Marxist-
Leninist international communism. But the Kremlin's attempt-
ed subjugation of Greece could not be stopped because it did
not exist. The United States could not "save" Greece from
Soviet communism because the salvation was not necessary.
This assessment, however, may be too harsh. The value of the
Truman Doctrine may have been in the fact that it provided
the aid and assistance which was crucial for the defeat of
the Greek communist insurgency . The Truman Doctrine could
have saved Greece from falling prey to a "communist" dicta-
torship. The next chapter will address the effects of the




V. U.S. ASSISTANCE AND THE DEFEAT OF THE COMMUNISTS
No discourse on the impact of the Truman Doctrine on
Greece can be conducted without examining the effects of
American military and economic aid on the Greek civil war.
It was this aid that is often seen as the decisive factor
which determined the outcome of the conflict. The explicit
reason given for this American foreign policy was to pro-
vide enough military and economic assistance to Greece so
that the Greeks could fight and win their own struggle
against communism.
The American program to assist the Athens government was
to be conducted as a two-pronged offensive: military and
economic. The primary effort was on the military front and
then on the economic front. Obviously, economic assistance
would have to be provided simultaneously with weapons.
The major danger facing the Greek government was economic
The economy was at the very heart of the problem. Economic
failure would cause the immediate collapse of the existing
government. The communist guerrilla war was directed against
the economy. The communist insurgents at that time probably
did not hope to win control of Greece by systematically
destroying the Greek armed forces; they hoped to win by
preventing economic recovery and growth. Their use of
guerrilla tactics and attacks on isolated villages, plus
their engagement of small garrisons of government forces,
clearly demonstrated this approach. After their serious
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defeat at the hands of the British, they probably felt that
the only road to victory was by preventing reconstruction and
causing further economic dislocation and deterioration.
Eventually, they could have expected that the whole system
would break down under its own weight and they would then step
in and pick up the pieces. If things got bad enough, the
rebels could have hoped that the people would turn to them
for their salvation. After all, was not Marxism-Leninism
an economic model?
The guerrilla war, launched in 1946, was effectively
preventing recovery and reconstruction. British monetary and
military support was the only thing that was apparently pre-
venting a communist victory. David Horowitz points out that
"In the first three post-war years the British had poured
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$760 million worth of supplies into Greece, ..." Un-
fortunately, most of this money was spent on basic subsist-
ence rather than on rebuilding the country. Then the British
announced that they could no longer affort to subsidize the
Greeks
.
Had the British pulled out of Greece as planned, on
March 31, 1947, without anyone else replacing them, the
chances would have been very good that the communists would
have eventually come to power. However, the United States
decided to become the new patron of Greece.
Once the Americans became immersed in the Greek problem,
it became clear that the military effort would have to take
precedence over other assistance. The war would have to be
won before the economic aid could be effective. It would
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do no good to rebuild bridges, construct highways, and build
factories if these could be destroyed easily by the guerrillas.
Consequently, the major American concern was the war effort,
combined with a measured and careful attempt to ease the
economic problems by providing the basic necessities and
subsistence for the populace and, at the same time, starting
building programs — such as port reconstruction — which
would help the military effort.
The task that Washington had decided to undertake was
much greater than the policy-makers appreciated. Neverthe-
less, a certain feeling of invincibility still permeated the
American attitude. The size of the problem in Greece must
have paled in the light of what had just been accomplished
during the Second World War. There was a crisis and emergen-
cy in Greece. But once the decision was made to intervene,
there was no thought of failure. The commitment of the
United States and its military and industrial might was the
panacea. Or was it? There were problems ahead which had
not been considered or analyzed.
The first major problem that confronted the United States
was the urgency of the situation. Prior to the arrival of
the British withdrawal notice on February 21, 1947, the Amer-
ican government had already given some thought to assisting
Greece. Richard Barnet explains that "At the Paris Peace
Conference on the Balkans, [u.S. Secretary of State James F.J
Byrnes had begun thinking about making a major United States
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commitment to Greece." Secretary Byrnes' thoughts were
passed to the planners at the Department of State and the
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Pentagon. In October 1946, the American Ambassador to Greece
"showed King George II a letter from the President suggesting
that the United States was prepared to grant 'substantial aid
72
and supplies'
. . . /'to Greece. The leaders in the United
States had also been watching developments in Greece with
great interest and were caught off guard only by the "thirty-
day notice" they were given. Nevertheless, the top decision-
makers moved quickly. By February 26, 1947, five days after
notification was given, the President, Secretary of State
Marshall, Secretary of War Patterson, and Navy Secretary
Forrestal all agreed that military and economic aid should be
73
given to Greece. They knew that they had to act fast.
The prognostication from the State Department was that quick
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action had to be taken if Greece was to be saved. Washing-
ton's concern had been heightened by the reports from Greece.
As late as February 20, 1,947, Ambassador MacVeagh in Greece,
in a telegram to Secretary of State Marshall stated in part:
"... Impossible to say how soon collapse may be antici-
pated, but we believe that to regard it as anything but
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imminent would be highly unsafe." On February 21, 1947,
Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a memorandum to
Secretary Marshall which also painted a grim picture. Acheson
commented that, "Reports from . . . Athens are unanimous in
their alarm over the probability that Greece will be unable
to maintain her independence. Determining factors are the
probability of an imminent economic and financial collapse
and the fact that Greek communists and the Soviet dominated
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governments of Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are making
every effort to prevent any improvement in Greek internal
76
affairs ..."
The top leaders in the United States government were
ready to take immediate action. However, the legislative
branch was not prepared to act as expeditiously, and bureau-
cratic inertia, coupled with normal physical constraints and
procedures, would reduce the response time. Nineteen days
after the United States was handed the Greek problem by the
British, President Truman went before Congress to ask for aid.
In his congressional address he underscored the need for
expeditious action when he said that "We have considered how
the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the
77
situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action, ..."
However, as has been previously stated, it was not until May
22, 1947, that President Truman signed the bill providing
the aid. It has also already been observed that it was not
until June 20, 1947, that the required agreement was signed
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with the Greeks. It took over ninety days to complete the
legal requirements alone. Next came the problems of delivery.
Fortunately for the United States and Greece, vast amounts
of war surplus materials were available for transfer. If the
necessary weapons had not been "on the shelf," by the time
that they could have been produced, it would have been too
late. If the weapons had been taken away from the American
armed forces, the U.S. security posture might have been
adversely affected. The quick availability of weapons in
the United States, Great Britain and Europe greatly simplified
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this problem. But still, arms could not be realistically
transferred overnight. It was not until May 20, 1947, that
a U.S. Army mission left for Athens to determine Greek mili-
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tary needs. Not until August 14, 1947, did the first ship-
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ment of arms for the Greek Army arrive in Greece. It took
time for the Americans to finally get directly involved in
Greece
.
The transition between American and British patronage
could also have been very difficult, if not devastating, had
it not been for London's decision to stick by the Greeks
until the United States could take over. Despite the an-
nounced plan to withdraw on March 31, Britain continued to
provide limited financial support for Greece. In late March
1947, it was even announced that the British Army and the
Royal Air Force had turned over h 1,500,000 ($6,045,000 at
the 1947 exchange rate) worth of surplus stocks and equip-
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ment to Greece. The British also maintained a military
mission, a police mission, and combat forces in the country.'
In addition, they continued to train the Greek armed forces.
After the initial delay in the delivery of weapons to
Greece the shipment of arms generally improved, but problems
continued. Despite U.S. military expenditures of over $150
million in the first year of the aid program, not enough
military material and economic aid had reached Greece to
"solve" the problem. On February 12, 1948, the U.S. National
Security Council published a top secret report for the
President entitled "The Position of the United States with
Respect to Greece." In the estimate it was stated:
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It is now apparent that the aid program of the United
States which expires June 30, 1948 will not strengthen
the Greek Government sufficiently to enable it to with-
stand communist pressure, unless further aid is forth-
coming. 8 2
It should be noted that this estimate addresses the total
question of aid. And, despite this estimate, in terms of
actual weapons and material, the Greek Army had reportedly
received sufficient weapons by this time and "... was
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completely equipped by the middle of 1948." Thus it took
over one year to get the weapons to Greece.
Besides getting enough "beans and bullets" to the battle-
field, there was also the issue of changing and upgrading
weapons. The Greek armed forces were almost totally equipped
with British weapons. American "Automatic rifles and machine
guns reached only two operational (Greek) Divisions by the
end of the civil war; rocket-launchers and recoilless rifles
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were in service only in the closing weeks." The decision
to exchange the previously held British rifles and machine
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guns for American ones was made in February 1948. The last
major battles of the war occurred in August 1949. It took a
long time to implement the plan for weapons modernization.
Even though it can be stated that the Greek Army "was
completely equipped by mid-1948" that does not mean that
they had all the types and quantities of equipment that they
needed or could have used. No great modernization effort had
taken place yet. For example, in early 1948 the Greek Army
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was given $25 million worth of ex-German war stocks. In
addition, not all of the weapons were provided by the United
States. In March 1948, approximately twenty-five thousand
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rifles were purchased for the Greek Army by Greek residents
87
of Britain.
The next problem faced by the United States was identi-
fication of the needs of the Greek armed forces. It would
have been impossible to reequip the entire army, navy, and
air force. Thus, critical needs had to be identified. These
needs and demands were also constrained and tempered by the
fact that not only were the Greek forces equipped with Brit-
ish arms, but they also had been trained by the British. The
transition to U.S. equipment would have to come, but it would
take time. In the interim British war supplies would have to
be used.
Compounding the dilemma of U.S. advice and assistance
was the basic problem that the Americans were new to the
Greeks and vice versa. It would take time to reach an under-
standing of the actual situation and to establish rapport.
Each side had to work hard to create the necessary symbiotic
relationship.
The American perception of the problem in Greece was
additionally clouded by a lack of understanding of Greece,
its people and the real nature of the conflict. In the
area of terrain alone the Americans did not immediately
grasp the situation. For example, the U.S. military mission
did not see the immediate need for mountain artillery — a
weapon which would have been extremely effective against the
guerrillas in the mountains. It was not until mid-1948,
after continuous Greek requests, that the U.S. began to send
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7 5mm pack howitzers to Greece.
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Another example of American misperceptions was the pro-
vision of vehicles when mules would have served the purpose
better. In discussing Greek Army needs before a congressional
committee on March 25, 1947, Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh
said:
What they need is a lot of mules and communications
apparatus, and that sort of thing, so they can operate
in the mountains. Now they roll up in trucks to a
point where the bandits blow up a bridge and the entire
endeavor is defeated. 89
Despite the ambassador's advice, the U.S. had shipped
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2,800 vehicles to the Greek forces by March 1948. (Had
not General Eisenhower said that the jeep was the vehicle
that had won the war?) Wheeled vehicles were plagued by
mechanical problems because of the poor roads in the country.
Vehicular problems also had a bad impact on the logistics
situation. In addition, vehicles hindered operations in
the mountains and reduced the element of surprise. In order
to redress this problem, in June 1949, an order was placed
for 4,000 mules. It was not until June 1949 that "all
infantry battalions were placed on the mountain unit estab-
lishment and all vehicles were withdrawn to the brigade motor
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transport platoon."
Based on the above example it would not be accurate to
conclude that the mule-vehicle trade-off had a good or bad
effect on the outcome of the war. It does, however, serve
to underscore the types of problems encountered and the
time it took to get things done.
The Americans also failed to perceive the importance of
the navy and the air force. This might have been because
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the rebels did not possess a navy or an air force and con-
sequently the Greek Navy and Air Force was not threatened.
Only six U.S. patrol boats were added to the Greek Navy dur-
92
ing the civil war. All other naval craft had been pro-
vided by the British.
The Greek Air Force also did not receive a large input
of American equipment. Greek air assets were modest and
should have been upgraded to provide for much better air
support for the ground forces. Part of this problem could
have been caused by monetary constraints and the relatively
long time that it would have taken to train pilots and air
crews. The provision of airplanes was probably also affected
by the belief that the war would end shortly. To acquire
aircraft and train their crews would have taken a long time.
In addition, the annual American congressional appropriations
cycle did not encourage long-range planning and expenditures
or increasingly expensive programs.
Throughout the Greek civil war the aerial assets came
predominately from British stocks. The British "Spitfire"
was the mainstay of the Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) and
it was their most effective air weapon until the closing
days of the war. The first American planes were delivered
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to Greece in February 1948. These aircraft were "trainer-
types" that were used mostly for observation and reconnais-
sance. The major combat aircraft provided by the United
States was the Curtiss "Helldiver" bomber. Forty-nine of
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these bombers were given to the Greeks in August 1949,
and they were first used in combat just five days before the
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end of the war.
Even though there were problems in the delivery of mate-
rial and the mix of equipment provided, an evaluation of
this aspect of U.S. aid alone would present a false picture.
There was much more to the effort than this. And even if
the problems in the equipment and other military-related
areas had been greater, it is vital to remember that there
were more important issues to consider. The political,
economic, and psychological impact of the American effort
was extremely significant. The fact that the United States
was backing the government in Athens and had laid its
prestige on the line was not an inconsequential matter.
(Unfortunately, how much this contributed to the ultimate
victory cannot be judged.)
The Truman Administration's decision to help Greece with
military and economic aid involved much more than the mere
transfer of weapons, ammunition, and supplies and equipment
from one country to another. The United States could not
just deliver its aid to the ports of Piraeus and Salonkia
and forget it. It had to insure that the material was
handled quickly and that it reached its intended recipient.
Washington also had to be certain that the American taxpayers'
money was being used for the intended purposes. Additionally,
some provisions had to be made to train the beneficiaries to
operate and employ the equipment that would be provided to
them.
President Truman and his advisers knew that there was
more involved than simple arms and monetary transfers. Thus,
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the President, in his proposed program, stated
In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize
the detail of American civilian and military personnel to
Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to
assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose
of supervising the use of such financial and material
assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that
authority also be provided for the instruction and train-
ing of selected Greek and Turkish personnel. 95
The request for personnel assistance was necessary if the
program was to be effective. However, the decision to involve
American military and civilian personnel had to be tempered
by domestic political considerations. Congress was in no
mood to entertain even the slightest indication or hint that
U.S. forces might be used to fight "someone else's war."
They were very leery of the possibilities of getting the
country inextricably entangled in a misconceived or misunder-
stood foreign venture. The American public was likewise not
interested in any venture which would require the deployment
of forces from the continental United States. The memory of
World War II and the sacrifices that had to be made was still
too fresh in their minds. Nevertheless, realistically, if
the aid package was to be effective it would have to involve
the stationing of Americans in Greece.
The Administration had already given some thought to the
involvement of combat troops in Greece. It had been decided,
however, that this contingency would only be considered
under extreme circumstances, which were unlikely in the
foreseeable future. There was no immediate intent to send
combat troops to Greece. Consequently, the proponents of
the aid to Greece policy moved quickly to dispel any possible
63

rumors or beliefs that support for the program would mean an
eventual commitment of a large number of civilians or mili-
tary forces. On March 24, 1947, Under Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, in testimony before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, said that the missions sent to Greece and Turkey
would be small. He also added that: "Our missions will
96
consist only of observers and advisers." This latter state-
ment was obviously meant to allay any fears that combat troops
would be used.
Congress accepted the Administration's plan and assurances,
but it also made sure that there were not many loopholes in
the law. In the "Act to Provide Assistance to Greece and
Turkey" the number of soldiers, sailors, and airmen that could
be used was "limited." The act also provided for instruction
and training but stipulated that the American military men
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could be used "in an advisory capacity only."
The significance of the limitation of the actual involve-
ment of Americans was an important factor which had an impact
on the United States' ability to handle equipment once it
had arrived in Greece, the number of Greek soldiers and
organizations that could be trained, and the number of
advisers that could be assigned to combat units.
The original size of the U.S. military advisory mission
sent to Greece was small and consisted of only sixty-two
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officers and men. It became quickly apparent that more
men were needed for the job at hand and by November 1947, it
was announced that the advisory mission would be increased to
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ninety officers and eighty men. "By early 1948 over two
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hundred and fifty U.S. officers were 'advising' the tactical
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operations of the Greek Army at the division level ..."
Throughout all of this advisory effort there were obsta-
cles along the way. Some of the barriers were small and
others were large. For instance, the Greeks originally had
been advised by the French and had accepted their staff
methods. Then came the British, and the Greeks were imbued
with their procedures. With the arrival of the Americans the
Greeks would have to adjust to still another system and
methodology.
During this entire period, from the beginning of the
"second round" in December 1944, until the end of the "third
round" in October 1949, the government in Athens — and
later the Americans -- were immeasurably assisted by Great
Britain. Even though the British had been forced to reduce
their commitment to Greece because of economic considerations
they did not abandon their Greek friends. They stayed to
help until American assistance arrived. Had they pulled out
abruptly, irreparable damage could have been done. The
maintainence of their presence made it easier for the United
States to take over and reduced the amount of time that it
would have taken before the impact of American assistance
was felt.
In October 1944, when the British returned to Greece with
the newly reconstituted Greek Government, there had been no
army to speak of. By the time the American advisers arrived
the Greek Army was approximately 100,000-men strong. The
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British had also trained the armed forces, civil defense
forces, and the police. Even after the U.S. arrival the
British maintained their mission in Greece, and they were
responsible for most of the in-country training provided to
the armed forces. Their police and prisons mission helped
train the national defense forces which ultimately became
responsible for the protection of the cities and towns.
This training, coupled with the expansion of the forces
which was made possible by American money, was significant
for the war effort. The creation of an efficient police
force and gendarmerie freed the army from static defense
and let it attend to its principal job of finding and
destroying the rebels.
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British troops remained in Greece until November 1949.
Their presence prevented adventurism by Greece's northern
neighbors. Their presence also lent moral support and gave
substance to the Greek Government and the Greek armed forces.
The foregoing discussion was not intended to denigrate
the American effort nor misrepresent its impact or import-
ance of the assistance provided. The intent has been to
add balance and understanding to the situation and the prob-
lem. Contrary to general belief, the provision of American
equipment does not seem to have been significant or deci-
sive for the outcome of the war. It arrived far too late.
American financial support, on the other hand, did allow
the Greeks to expand and maintain a larger military force.







National Defense Corps 50,000
America provided not only the arms and ammunition for this
force but also their clothes, food, and salaries. However,
was this force totally responsible for victory? A thorough
examination of the facts would lead to the conclusion that
the Greek Government's ability to put down the insurrection
and prevent the takeover of the country by a communist
minority would have been greatly reduced with the withdraw-
al of the British and without American assistance. But
other factors which have been discussed (i.e., British sup-
pression of the "second round" and the lack of Soviet support
for the insurgents) were also very important.
American involvement in Greece between 1947 and 1949
could serve as a model for other similar situations. It
clearly demonstrated that it takes time to assist a country
with military and economic aid — even in crisis situations.
Assistance cannot be provided within a matter of days or
weeks. The Greek case also vividly highlights the importance
of American domestic politics and public sentiment and the
government's ability to react to a foreign crisis. Further-
more, it demonstrates that there are limitations even after
the decision to assist or intervene has been made.
The Greek crisis should, additionally, serve as a
paradigm for U.S. military assistance efforts. Clearly there
is much more involved in an aid program than the transfer of
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weapons from one point to another. There are many things in-
volved such as: training, military missions, advisory teams,
etc. The lessons should be obvious.
Two qualified observers of the Greek civil war, in their
writings, have probably summed up the impact of the American
military aid and mission best. U.S. Marine Corps Colonel
James C. Murray, a member of the military mission in Greece
in 1949, discussed the provisioning of Greek Army units
with American arms in the latter part of the war. He states:
The improvements (in armaments) came gradually, . . .
,
and did not hit their full stride until after hostili-
ties were over.
In all probability the war would have ended had no
changes in armament occurred. 10^
British Colonel CM. Woodhouse, who served as the com-
mander of the Allied Military Mission in Greece during World
War II, noted that, "A post-war analysis concluded that
AMAG (American Mission for Aid to Greece) did not achieve
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its full results until after hostilities were over."
But, the impact of American aid cannot be dismissed in such
a cavalier fashion without delving further into the causes
which led to the communist's defeat.
The lack of Soviet aid and support for the guerrillas
has already been discussed. The impact of American aid and
involvement has likewise been chronicled. We must now turn
to other matters which were responsible for or contributed to
the final outcome.
Initially, it should be observed that no one event or
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action can be singled out, realistically, as being predomi-
nantly or exclusively responsible for termination of the
Greek civil war. More appropriately, it must be recognized
that the end result was the cumulative product of the inter-
actions of specific forces, within a given environment, and
during a particular period of time. Given other circum-
stances in the same place and during a different time, the
consequences would have indeed been different. The situation
in Greece at the end of 1949 is analogous to a chemical
experiment. Specific ingredients, in measured quantities,
were blended together under unique conditions of temperature
and pressure to produce a desired substance. Given a dif-
ferent set of chemicals, and a variant environment, a dif-
ferent substance would have been produced.
There can be no doubt that the massive aid and assistance
provided by the United States was a key ingredient in affect-
ing the outcome of the Greek civil war. Without a doubt,
psychologically and economically, the Truman Doctrine had a
far-reaching and positive impact on the pro-Western Greek
faction. Yet, American policies and assistance did not win
the civil war.
Beyond the consideration of the American factor within
the Greek equation, the actions of the Soviet Union also
played a dramatic and incontrovertible role in the Greek
tragedy. Nevertheless, the lack of Russian complicity and
their desire to end the crisis does not represent the de-
cisive factor of the war.
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It can be unequivocally stated that the American-backed
forces won the war. However, when the question is asked:
Why did they win? it is probably accurate to say that they
won themselves with outside assistance. In addition, it
should be noted that the Greek communists contributed
significantly to their own defeat.
It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to rank by
order of importance the exact impact of American aid and
Soviet involvement (or non-involvement) with respect to the
outcome of the Greek civil war. It would probably be even
more difficult to operationalize and rank all the variables
that contributed to the communist defeat. It is not all that
important to determine what factors more than others affected
the outcome of the war. What is important to understand is
that many events and many factors cumulatively interacted
to influence the outcome.
It can be effectively argued that without American
economic aid and military assistance, after the British with-
drawal, the Greek Government probably would have collapsed,
leaving the guerrillas in an excellent position to take over
the reins of government within a short period of time. On
the other hand, recent American experiences would indicate
that in order to decisively defeat communist insurgents,
other events must occur and certain conditions must be met.
Recent history has clearly demonstrated that American economic
assistance and military aid — even military force alone —




The defeat of the communist insurgent forces in Greece
began with the "second round" of the civil war in December
1944. EAM-ELAS was at the apex of its power just prior to
the return of the government-in-exile and the British in
October 1944. As previously discussed, EAM-ELAS was in al-
most total control of the country at that time. There was
no Greek force capable of opposing them. In addition, the
returning government was too weak and disorganized to mount
an effective campaign against them. However, EAM-ELAS was
also somewhat disorganized and apparently did not have a
good plan at hand to take over. It lost precious time be-
fore it initiated its operations to seize power. Moreover,
it did not have the same type of assistance and support which
the Soviets provided to other countries which they had
occupied in ruthlessly removing its opposition. The Greek
communists also failed to get their members named to key
ministries in the new government such as the ministry of
interior. In essence, they did not —and possibly could
not — exploit their advantages and seize the proper moment
to act.
Beyond the EAM-ELAS weaknesses noted above, its major
mistake at this time was that it misjudged the intentions and
resolve of the British. Had the communists suspected what
the British would do, they could have timed their actions
better and taken steps to neutralize or reduce the impact of
British actions (i.e., propaganda campaigns against British
"imperialism" and disruption of London's efforts to reinforce
and resupply its forces in Greece) . The setback handed to
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them by the British also removed some of the sheen of politi-
cal legitimacy and forced them to resume "bandit" operations
and the concomitant "bandit" image.
As a result of the "second round," EAM-ELAS moved from
a decidedly superior to a generally inferior position. It
had reached the pinnacle of its power and henceforth it de-
clined steadily.
The suppression of the "second round" insurrection in
December 1944-January 1945 was not the only significant Brit-
ish action that contributed to the communist's ultimate loss.
It should be recalled that it was Winston Churchill who had
arranged with Joseph Stalin for Greece to remain within the
"Western sphere." British economic support after the Second
World War had also been a critical factor. They had played
a key role in the return of the exiled government to Greece,
and within their capabilities had begun the reconstruction
of the government and the armed forces. Their presence prob-
ably prevented Soviet adventurism. When they were forced to
reduce their commitment they assisted in the transition to
American patronage. They played an important part in the
training of police and self-defense forces. The British
also maintained a military force in Greece until the end of
the "third round." Tautologically , the British contributed
significantly to the communist loss.
The machinations of the British, Russians and Americans
did not stop the Greek communists from waging a guerrilla
war. Foreign intervention and assistance did not serve as
the coup de grace . The decisive blows which ended the civil
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war were meted out by the national Greek government and by
the communists themselves.
The Greek communists contributed significantly to their
own downfall by alienating the populace and many of their
own followers. The KKE leadership also irreparably damaged
its cause by making some very ill-advised and untimely
decisions. For example, early in the war the guerrillas
decided that only Greeks would be used in the fight to un-
105
seat the government in Athens. This decision, standing
by itself, would not appear to have been a bad one. How-
ever, when combined with other developments, it limited its
ability to recruit and field the requisite fighting force.
The guerrillas also made a grave mistake when they resort-
ed to terrorism and brutality against their fellow countrymen.
Granted that their harsh tactics produced an almost insur-
mountable problem for the Greek Government by creating a very
large refugee problem. By early 1949, there were over
700,000 refugees from the war (approximately one-tenth of
the population) that depended on the government for subsist-
106
ence. These refugees placed a great economic burden on
the country. But, beyond this burden, the massive numbers
of refugees also reflected a lack of support and sympathy
for the communists. Left-wing terrorism and the forced
recruitment of fighting men and women exponentially increased
the human misery and suffering, which in turn, reduced the
popular support that the guerrillas would need during the
latter stages of the war. The KKE ' s tactics drove many
peasants from their rural towns and villages into larger
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populated, government-controlled areas. Consequently, many
of those who could have helped the communists were lost;
many more, who were neutral, became opponents; and the man-
power pool in the countryside began to evaporate. By early-
and mid-1949, as the Greek National Army's capabilities,
efficiency, and offensive operations increased, rebel casu-
alties mounted. In order to replace their losses, the guer-
rillas had to rely more and more on poorly-trained soldiers
and forced recruits. They had to depend on many who did not
want to fight and did not believe in "the cause." Additional-
ly, the proportion of Slavo-Macedonians , rather than ethnic
Greeks, that constituted the communist fighting forces grew
sharply. CM. Woodhouse noted that by mid-1949 "14,000 out
of less than 20,000 guerrilla fighters were Slavo- Macedon-
107
ians." The movement began to lose its indigenous facade.
The Greek government used the harsh guerrilla tactics to
its advantage as it propagandized and proselytized the citi-
zenry. The best example of this was the well publicized
108
guerrilla abduction of between 25,000 and 30,000 children.
These children were all taken behind the "Iron Curtain."
Kidnapping children does not win friends or converts; it
does adversely influence the people.
The most severe blow to the insurgents was dealt to them
by their communist brethren. After the "second round" the
KKE disbanded ELAS and formed the "Democratic Army" (DSE)
.
The KKE and DSE were able to prosecute the war because of
support and sanctuaries being provided by their communist
Balkan neighbors: Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The
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Yugoslav support was especially critical for the success and
longevity of the guerrilla operations. However, this assis-
tance was not totally altruistic.
The Greek communists could not have sustained a war
against the established government without outside assistance.
The leadership of the KKE was well aware of this. Therefore,
it turned to the closest and most logical sources for support
— other Balkan communists. Greece's communist neighbors
were very willing to aid the KKE, but for a price. Despite
the internationalist appearance and rhetoric of Marxism-
Leninism, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria hoped to get something in
return for their assistance. Their expected gains were
primarily driven by nationalistic interests rather than a
burning desire to participate in the establishment of another
communist country. Out of ignorance, necessity, or ideology,
plus probably a degree of desperation, the KKE willingly
acceded to Yugoslav and Bulgarian demands. These demands
damaged the KKE ' s image and caused internal dissension. The
KKE also failed to accurately assess and analyze these demands
Had it done so, it would have seen that its relationship
with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was based on convenience and
that when the circumstances were no longer convenient, or
conflicted with other interests, it would be abandoned by
its patrons. The crux of the dilemma was based on Bulgaria's
desire to annex Thrace and Yugoslavia's efforts to unify all
of Macedonia under Belgrade's control. Richard Barnet indi-
cates that by late-1946 General Markos , the head of the




Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Barnet also reveals
that "Tito agreed to give more weapons and supplies £to the
Greek rebels] in return for the right to veto any changes
110
in the high command of the Greek Democratic Army." Thus,
the Greek communists placed themselves at the mercy of un-
reliable, capricious and opportunistic patrons.
In 1948, an open rift developed between the Yugoslav
communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, and Russian leader Joseph
Stalin. This rift led to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from
the Cominform on June 28, 1948. The break in the communist
ranks also caused a split within the KKE. There were those
who sided with Stalin and those who were sympathetic to Tito.
The pro-Stalin faction gained the upper hand and purged the
pro-Tito element. The pro-Tito element included some of the
more capable guerrilla fighters including the military leader
General Markos
.
By January 1949, Colonel Murray notes that supplies for
the guerrillas from Yugoslavia had "fallen off to a mere
111
trickle." In addition, because of the Tito-Stalin dis-
pute, Yugoslavia closed the border to the Greek guerrillas on
112
July 10, 1949. In discussing the effects of this Yugoslav
action, Theodore Couloumbis relates that it " . . . enabled
the Greek forces to concentrate on insulating the Greek-
Albanian frontier, and left open on the Greek-Bulgarian fron-
tier which was too distant from the Communist base of opera-
tions . . . to be of any military significance. Thus communist
guerrilla supply lines were cut, with commensurate loss in
113
their tactical effectiveness." According to Murray, the
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Yugoslav border closing also meant that 30 to 35 percent of
the guerrilla fighters were lost to, or isolated fron, the
114
main effort.
The KKE compounded the border closing problem by deciding
to use conventional tactics to meet the reconstituted, re-
organized and attacking Greek Army. The rebel leader Nikos
Zakhariadis decided to give up guerrilla tactics and defend
115
the communist base areas within Greece. One of the major
precepts of guerrilla warfare is not to hold ground for any
length of time during the unconventional warfare phase of
operations. Guerrillas that decide to hold ground against a
relatively modern conventional force are condemned to failure,
The "Democratic Army's" decision to "fight fire with
fire" came at a bad time. The politicians in Athens had
finally understood many of the shortcomings of the military
structure and they agreed to reorganize and place the Army
under a unified command — thus eradicating much of the petty
bickering and political influence that had plagued the Army's
efficiency. Up until this time the politicians' control had
been so great that U.S. News and World Report pointed out in
an article in March 1948, that:
Political control of the 132,000-man Q^reek] Army has
been so great that members of Parliament often vetoed
military orders, t^ncf) had Army units stationed in their
own areas regardless of military needs elsewhere. 116
The most important development of the reorganization was
the appointment of the very capable Field Marshal Alexander
117
Papagos as the new commander-in-chief on January 19, 1949.
Marshal Papagos had been the commander of the forces that had
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defeated the Italians in 1940-1941. As reported in The Times
of London
,
he had a "well-known flair for choosing the best
118
subordinates." Prior to accepting the appointment,
Papagos had laid down certain demands and conditions which
the government accepted. These demands included: complete
control of planning, order of battle, appointments and oper-
ations; no interference by the allied missions; and martial
119
law throughout the country, with strict censorship.
Papagos' leadership and abilities regenerated the military.
His impact was described best by Murray when he wrote: "Under
Papagos the Army was galvanized into action. Its manpower
was not increased, its training was not greatly improved and
there was no significant increase in its equipment. The Army
was simply made to do what it was capable of doing, and no
120
more than this was then needed to gain victory." Thus
the Greek communists, who had decided to use conventional
tactics, met a much larger, better equipped and markedly more
efficient force on the battlefield. The outcome of the civil
war was now assured.
But what of those diehards and doubters? The communists
added to their growing problems and increased the disaffection
for their cause when on March 1, 1948, their station, "Free
Greece Radio," announced that the KKE was supporting the
Macedonian National Liberation Front and the creation of an
121
independent and autonomous Macedonian state. This overt
act publicly abdicated Greek rights to a portion of their
country. To the average Greek, who was (and is) very
nationalistic, this was an act of treason. It was one thing
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for Greek to fight Greek. It was quite something else to
advocate giving up the land that your ancestors had fought
for to someone else. This radio announcement not only help-
ed the cause of the government in Athens, but it also caused
more rifts within the KKE itself. Many communists were
nationalists and were not fighting to give away part of
their homeland.
The determined Greek communist attempt to gain control
of Greece finally ended on October 16, 1949, when the com-
munist radio announced that the "Greek Democratic Army" had
122
decided to "cease-fire." The insurrection had collapsed
under the weight of all those events and actions which have
been previously detailed. Many actors deserve credit for
the results. However, the ultimate credit goes to the Greek
people themselves. Their stamina, determination and perse-
verance provided the leaven for victory. The Greek people
are the ones who suffered the most and sustained themselves
long enough to savor the fruits of their labor — victory.
They deserve the praise for the results.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In attempting to analyze and understand the Greek civil
war and the Truman Doctrine, a great deal of caution must be
exercised in order to avoid subjective, emotionally charged
or erroneous conclusions. This must be so because only half
of the story is known. There is no shortage of books, biog-
raphies, memoirs, articles, official documents, etc., on the
subject in the West; however, there is a paucity of source
material from the East. Unfortunately many of those on "the
other side" have either not told their story or for their own
reasons have not told the full story. Official Soviet, Yugo-
slav, Albanian, Bulgarian, and other records are not available
for study and scrutiny. One cannot assiduously review the
events in Moscow during this critical period as one can those
in Washington, London, and Athens. As long as this situation
prevails, there will be doubt and disagreement. There can be
no final judgment until the records of the KKE are perused.
Nevertheless, certain observations can be made.
There is no doubt that this period in history represented
one of those times of transition. It was a time of great
upheaval, when "old truths" were no longer true and the
"new truths" were not understood. It was a time of drastic
change and turmoil in the international political order. It
was a time of great opportunity, anxiety and fear. There was
a great deal of room for misunderstandings and mistakes. It
was a time when errors in judgment and miscalculations could
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be made easily. The Greek civil war was one of those events
that was not understood and, paradoxically, misunderstood at
the same time. It was an internal struggle for political
power, even though it was viewed as part of an international
conspiracy. Communism was not "monolithic." Moscow did not
control or support all communist movements. But because the
Kremlin was not behind the war in Greece did not make it
less insidious and more palatable. "International" Marxist-
Leninist ideology was behind the conflict in Greece. This
did not, however, make the implications and the fact of the
war less dangerous or important — especailly for the Greeks.
But above all, it must be remembered that the war in Greece
was started by Greeks and it had to be the Greeks who ended
it.
The American and British reactions to this crisis are
understandable but cannot stand without criticism. It is
interesting to note that a great deal of what has been written
on the subject indicates that American actions were based on
American interests. These interests were seen as being
directly threatened by Soviet interests, which were not
totally known or understood. Somewhere in the transition
between war and peace, both sides probably simplified the
issues to "good versus evil." The complexion of things be-
came black and white; there was no gray. Greece was gray but
could not be seen as such.
The American involvement in Greece was almost totally
based on U.S. national security interests. To a lesser degree
the decision to intervene in Greece was driven by the sub-
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conscious political ethos of the leadership in America. The
actions of the United States were not based on an overwhelming
desire to help the Greeks; they were driven by national secu-
rity interests and a belief in what was right. As Seyom
Brown has observed
As sincere as any Administration has been in professing
our pJ.S.Q larger commitment to the well-being and lib-
erties of all peoples, all have tended to decide major
foreign policy questions, ultimately, in terms of the
irreducible national interest: how will a given action
or program affect the power of the United States to
secure its way of life for at least its own people? What
actions and programs are required in order to keep the
power of potential adversaries below a level at which
they could force the United States to choose between its
survival and its way of life.-'-^^
The Truman Doctrine, clearly, was promulgated in the name of
U.S. national security interests and for the protection of
its citizens.
In reviewing the events prior to, during, and after the '
implementation of the Truman Doctrine several facts stand
out. For example: except for consultations with the British,
the American decision to aid Greece was almost unilateral.
The Greeks were not consulted in a meaningful fashion. The
United Nations was bypassed completely. No negotiations
were attempted or discussions held with the Soviets, Yugoslavs
Albanians, Bulgarians, et al. There do not appear to have
been any discussions of policy alternatives within the high-
124
est councils of the American Government. The fear of
monolithic communism, the danger of political isolation, the
future threat of economic encirclement, and indigenous
ideologies and ideals did not let Washington see what was
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happening in Greece. Fear did not allow for a measured
response to world events.
Much of the fear about "monolithic" communism, Soviet
intentions, and the exact nature of the problem in Greece
could have been eliminated by an efficient national intelli-
gence organization. Unfortunately one did not exist.' Along
with the general demobilization after the Second World War
came the reduction of American intelligence capabilities.
It was not until the passage of the National Security Act of
125
1947, in July of that year, that the United States began
to organize and build an intelligence structure capable of
meeting the increasing needs for accurate information. Good
intelligence information, operations, and analysis was
absolutely imperative for the formulation of sound decisions
and policies. The Truman Administration initially did not
have the intelligence to support its needs; consequently, it
had to rely on its own perceptions and instinctive judgments.
The administration had no other choice.
In spite of the fact that there was no good intelligence
information available, there were alternatives available.
One possible alternative was the United Nations; however,
the United States had lost faith in that organization's
ability to solve crises and global political problems. The
United Nations was also circumvented because of the antici-
pated Soviet veto in the Security Council. Nevertheless, the
Russians could have been consulted. They were not consulted.
The success of the Greeks in defeating the communists
led to a false sense of accomplishment. It led American
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decision-makers to believe that the policy was sound and had
succeeded in stopping the spread of communism. These beliefs
were the forebears of more difficult problems. These beliefs
and the Truman Doctrine ultimately led to American involve-
ment in Korea and Vietnam.
It should be clear to the reader by now that the Truman
Doctrine and American assistance alone did not save Greece
from communism. The research conducted for this thesis also
clearly draws one to the conclusion that the American decision
to become involved in Greece was based on the false assumption
that the Soviet Union had instigated, was supporting, and was
directing the Greek insurgents. Succinctly stated, it would
appear that the Truman Doctrine did not achieve its purpose.
But did this policy fail altogether? What was the value and
meaning, if any, of this program? Was it wrong? Was it use-
less?
In order to place the Truman Doctrine in its proper
perspective again, it may be valuable to reiterate those
factors which contributed to the collapse of the communist
insurgency in Greece. The following developments and actions
were obviously significant (not listed in order of importance)
:
— The British support and assistance from 1944 through
1949.
Lack of Soviet interest and involvement in the
rebellion.
American aid and assistance.




— The internal split within the KKE and its decision
to use conventional tactics just prior to the end of
hostilities.
— The KKE's terrorist tactics and its recruitment
policies, which alienated the populace.
— The anti-communist nature of the Greeks in general.
— The Tito-Cominform rift and the eventual closing of
the Yugoslav border to the Greek communist insurgents.
The Greek communists' association with autonomy
movements which were inimical to the Greek national character
and interests (i.e., support for the Macedonian National
Liberation Front)
.
The accession of Field Marshal Papagos as the
commander-in-chief
.
In reviewing the above list, if we again ask the question:
Did the Truman Doctrine save Greece? we must answer that it
contributed to victory but probably was not the decisive
factor. In fact, if certain other events had not occurred
it could be concluded that all of the American aid in the
world could not have saved Greece (Vietnam being a good case
in point) . Nevertheless, the Truman Doctrine cannot be
dismissed in such a frivolous manner. Perhaps, the true
meaning and value of the Truman Doctrine cannot be ascertain-
ed by the question previously asked, but rather by rephrasing
the question and asking: What would have happened to Greece
without American aid? This latter question is rather con-
tentious because it requires a totally speculative answer.
It can, however, be safely noted that without American aid
85

and assistance, coupled with the British withdrawal, the
Greek communists would have had a much greater chance of
success. The odds would have been, most certainly, in favor
of a communist victory.
The arguments noted may appear to be paradoxical. On
the one hand it is stated that the Truman Doctrine did not
save Greece and at the same time it is also noted that with-
out it the communists stood an excellent chance of winning.
Both statements are basically accurate. However, we can
never be totally sure of the outcome without American aid
because that did not happen. The course of history might
have been changed i_f events had not occurred as they did;
but, "if" is one of those imponderable and intangible words.
In actuality, the meaning of the Truman Doctrine is much
more subtle and important. Its value is not tied strictly
to Greece, but more importantly, to global politics and
international relations. The Truman Doctrine must be seen
as the correct general policy for the United States and
Europe at that time. It must also be viewed as the right
American global foreign policy for several reasons.
Despite the fact that the Soviets were not involved in
Greece, if the United States had not acted to support the
pro-Western faction in Athens, the Russians might have moved
— at least covertly — to aid the rebels and they could
have eventually added another country to their growing
sphere of influence. The establishment of a communist govern-
ment in Athens, without control by the Kremlin, would have
at least favored the Soviet Union. Thus, the United States
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might not have saved Greece from the Soviets between 1947 and
1949, but in the long run, American actions probably saved
the Greeks from Soviet adventurism and possible future
domination by the Kremlin.
The Truman Doctrine also served as a vehicle for ending
American isolationism and the reestablishment of a balance
of power in Europe. If the United States had reverted to
its isolationist tendencies it would have eventually with-
drawn most if not all of its forces from Europe and any re-
introduction of American power, at a later date, would have
been extremely difficult. Therefore, Greece helped provide
a catalyst for the retention of an American presence and
involvement in Europe. In addition, without the American
commitment in Europe the balance of power would have swung
in favor of the Soviet Union. No country in Europe at that
time was capable of challenging Soviet power and influence
without American assistance. In fact, no group of countries
could have stopped Russian hegemony in the foreseeable future
without support from the United States. Thus the Truman Doc-
trine can probably be credited with the prevention of a
Soviet-forced, total communization or control of Europe.
The Truman Doctrine also had another, almost impercep-
tible, value . Its announcement and implementation placed the
Soviets and other Marxist-Leninist, international communist
movements on notice that the United States would not stand
idly by and watch one country after another fall under a
communist, leftist dictatorship. The Truman Doctrine clear-
ly discouraged blatant communist adventurism and immeasurably
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bolstered the hopes of those forces resisting communist
subjugation. American association with the final victory
against the Greek communists helped dispell any belief in
the invincibility of communist forces and the inevitability
of communist world domination. The Truman Doctrine encouraged
anti-communist forces throughout the world and gave them the
spirit to resist.
Despite all of the comments and observations, the over-
all historical assessment of the Truman Doctrine may prove
to be fateful and ironic. Time may judge that it was the
correct policy for the time, but for the wrong reasons. Its
value may prove to be much greater than previously accepted.
The value and meaning of the Truman Doctrine becomes even
more important during a time when many pundits are heralding
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